地下洞室施工安全隐患整改行为演化博弈分析

Technological Forecasting and Social Change,2010,77(6):857-869.Evolutionary game analysis of rectification behavior for safety hazards in underground tunnel construction

随着地下洞室建设规模和难度的不断提高,施工安全问题也成了亟需关注的焦点。因此,利用演化博弈理论构建施工单位、监理单位和政府安全监管部门的三方博弈模型,并利用系统动力学(SD)进行仿真分析。结果表明:博弈三方策略的初始概率对系统演化有正向作用;政府加大对施工单位和监理单位的处罚力度比奖励更有效;施工单位投入成本的差异越大,系统达到演化稳定均衡所需迭代的次数越多。

With the continuous increase in the scale and difficulty of underground cavern construction,construction safety issues have become an urgent focus of attention.Therefore,the evolutionary game theory is used to construct a tripartite game model for construction units,supervision units,and government safety supervision departments,and system dynamics(SD)is used for simulation analysis.The results indicate that the initial probability of the three party strategy in the game has a positive effect on the system evolution;the government’s increased punishment of construction and supervision units is more effective than rewards;the greater the difference in investment costs between construction units,the more iterations are required for the system to achieve evolutionary stability equilibrium.