纵向兼任高管与企业战略导向

Vertical interlocks of executives and corporate strategic orientation

纵向兼任高管对企业具体行为的作用效果如何存在争议,而战略是企业各项行动决策的起点,存在纵向兼任高管的企业倾向于采取何种战略值得关注。鉴于此,以2010—2021年中国A股上市公司为研究样本考察纵向兼任高管对企业战略导向的影响,研究结果表明,存在纵向兼任高管的企业倾向于选择防御型战略。与非垄断行业相比,垄断行业削弱了纵向兼任高管对企业防御型战略偏好的促进作用;与非国有企业相比,存在纵向兼任高管的国有企业对防御型战略的偏好程度显著降低。进一步的经济后果检验表明,纵向兼任高管的存在提升了企业运营效率,降低了企业经营风险和股价崩盘风险,且企业战略导向在其中发挥了部分中介作用。

There is controversy over the impact of vertical interlocks of executives on specific corporate actions,and strategy is the starting point for various action decisions,so it is worth paying attention to what strategies enterprises with vertical interlocks of executives tend to adopt.Using China′s A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2021 as a research sample,this study examines the impact of vertical concurrent executives on corporate strategic orientation.The findings suggest that companies with vertical interlocks of executives tend to adopt defensive strategies.Moreover,compared with non-monopolized industries,monopolized ones weaken the role of vertical interlocks of executives in promoting enterprises′defensive strategic preferences,and compared with non-state-owned enterprises,state-owned ones with such executives have a significantly lower preference for defensive strategies.Further economic consequence tests indicate that vertical interlocks of executives improve corporate operational efficiency,reduce the risks of corporate operation and stock price collapse,and that enterprises′strategic orientation plays a partial intermediary role in this process.