摘要
以2013—2022年沪深A股混改国有上市公司为研究样本,从非国有股东委派董事及其投票行为两方面刻画非国有董事治理,借助检验非国有董事治理对混改国企分红和关联交易的影响,考察非国有董事治理是否存在追求眼前利益现象,并在异质性分析基础上进一步探寻缓解措施。研究发现,非国有董事治理与混改国企分红水平和关联交易水平正相关,即非国有董事治理存在追求眼前利益现象;异质性分析发现,该现象在政府放权意愿低和环境不确定性高的条件下更显著;进一步探寻缓解措施发现,提高投资者保护水平、提高非国有股东股权和控制权对等度能够有效缓解非国有董事治理存在的追求眼前利益现象。研究结果对政府完善国企混改顶层设计、国有企业科学制定和实施混改方案具有重要启示意义。
Taking state-owned listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share mixed reform during 2013-2022 as the research sample,the governance of non-state-owned directors is depicted from the two aspects of non-state-owned shareholders’appointment of directors and their voting behavior.By examining the influence of non-state-owned directors’governance on dividends and related transactions of state-owned enterprises under mixed reform,it is investigated whether there is the phenomenon of pursuing immediate interests in the gover⁃nance of non-state-owned directors.And further explore mitigation measures on the basis of heterogeneity analy⁃sis.The results show that the governance of non-state-owned directors is positively correlated with the dividend level and related transaction level of state-owned enterprises in the reform,that is,the governance of non-state owned directors is pursuing immediate interests.Heterogeneity analysis shows that this phenomenon is more signif⁃icant under the conditions of low government willingness to delegate power and high environmental uncertainty.Further exploring mitigation measures,it is found that improving the level of investor protection and the equality of equity and control rights of non-state-owned shareholders can effectively alleviate the phenomenon of pursuing immediate interests existing in the governance of non-state-owned directors.This study has important implica⁃tions for the government to improve the top-level design of state-owned enterprise mixed reform,and for state owned enterprises to scientifically formulate and implement mixed reform plans.
作者
独正元
DU Zheng-yuan(School of Economics and Management,North University of China,Taiyuan 030027,China)
出处
《经济问题》
CSSCI
北大核心
2024年第1期113-122,共10页
On Economic Problems
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目“国家审计、协同监督与国企资产保值增值”(71872105)
山西省社科联重点课题“深化国资国企改革增强山西转型发展动能研究”(SSKLZDKT2023058)
山西省高等学校哲学社会科学研究项目“深化国企混改对山西省供应链韧性的影响与机制研究”(2023W083)。
关键词
非国有董事治理
国企混改
分红
关联交易
non-state-owned directors’governance
mixed reform
dividend
related transaction