考虑有限理性的消费者结构对不对称电商预售策略的影响研究

A Study on the Influence of Consumer Structure with Bounded Rationality on Asymmetric E-commerce Pre-sale Strategy

下沉式预售作为一种改善预售体验的新型模式已为许多电商企业关注。本文考虑有限理性消费者前提下研究物流服务不对称电商平台关于预售模式的策略竞争,得到不同条件下双方Nash博弈的均衡策略。研究结果表明:(1)只有当市场中有限理性消费者数量低于一定阈值时,两个物流服务不对称电商平台才会同时采用下沉式预售模式。(2)当市场中有限理性消费者数量高于一定阈值时,两个物流服务不对称电商平台仍将同时采用普通预售模式。(3)当市场中有限理性消费者数量适中时,普通预售模式下具有物流服务优势的电商平台如果决定下沉式预售时仍保持物流服务优势,最终反而不会采用下沉式预售模式,而竞争对手将采用下沉式预售模式与之竞争;普通预售模式下,不具有物流服务优势的电商平台如果决定下沉式预售下的物流服务优于对手,其竞争对手将采用下沉式预售模式,此电商平台只能仍使用普通预售模式与之竞争。此外,本文还分别分析了普通预售模式下具有物流服务优势的电商平台的商品交货时间、市场中有限理性消费者数量对两个电商平台决策结果的影响,并得到两个电商平台在四类预售竞争模式中不同条件下决策结果的大小关系。

As a new business model to improve consumers’presale experience sinking presale is attracting the attention of many e-commerce companies.More and more e-commerce companies adopt sinking presale mode since 2019.On the other hand,consumer structure affects the e-commerce companies’decision-making.Therefore,is the sinking presale mode is a better choice for asymmetric e-commerce platforms in presence of bounded rational consumers?Can the asymmetric e-commerce platforms win the competition by adopting dif⁃ferentiated presale strategy?How the consumer structure affect the asymmetric e-commerce platforms’strategy choosing?In this paper,the Hotelling model is utilized to construct the duopoly market and four scenarios are analyzed:(1)Both of the asymmetric e-commerce platforms adopt regular presale mode,(2)the ecommerce platform with better logistic service adopts regular presale mode while the other one adopts sinking presale mode,(3)the e-commerce platform with better logistic service adopts sinking presale mode while the other one adopts regular presale mode,and(4)Both of the asymmetric e-commerce platforms adopt sinking presale mode.After deducing the optimal pricing of the asymmetric e-commerce platforms under different competition scenarios,the decision results are compared and the Nash equilibria are obtained.The study shows that(1)only when the proportion of bounded rational consumers in the market is below a certain threshold,two logistics service asymmetric e-commerce platforms will adopt the sinking presale mode simultaneously.(2)When the proportion of bounded rational consumers is higher than a certain threshold,the two logistics service asymmetric e-merchants will still adopt the general presale mode simultaneously.(3)When the proportion of bounded rational consumers is moderate,if the e-commerce platform with logistics service advantage in the general presale mode decides to maintain the logistics service advantage in the sinking presale mode,it will eventually not adopt the sinking presale mode,and its competitors will adopt the sinking presale mode to compete with it;if the e-commerce platform without logistics service advantage in the general presale mode decides to choose better logistics service than its competitor in the sinking presale mode,its competitors will adopt the sink pre-sale model,while this e-commerce platform can only compete with it by adopting the general presale mode.In addition,the impact of the product delivery time of the e-commerce platform with logistics service advantage in the general presale mode and the proportion of bounded rational consumers on the decision outcomes of the two e-commerce platforms is analyzed,and the comparisons between the decision outcomes of the two e-commerce platforms are obtained in the four different presale competition scenarios under different conditions.