实在论还是唯心论?——评关于维特根斯坦语言哲学的一场论争

Realism or Idealism?-Revisiting a Debate on Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Language

对维特根斯坦在语言与现实关系问题上所持的立场,学界多年来争论不休,并分化出“唯心论”与“实在论”两类对立的阐释传统。本文指出:形而上学层面上的实在论与唯心论流于空洞的体系建构,是维氏批判的对象;而反形而上学的阐释,如安斯康姆的“语言唯心论”与普特南的“内在实在论”,非但不冲突,还共同为理解维特根斯坦的语言哲学提供学理线索与解释张力。通过对这两种反形而上学阐释的深入探索可以明确维特根斯坦对语言与现实关系这一语言哲学核心论题做出的重要贡献。

There has been a heated debate in the academia for decades concerning Wittgenstein's stance in the issue of language-reality relationship,and two conflicting camps sprang into existence:the realist and the idealist interpretation traditions.This article intends to demonstrate that metaphysical realism and idealism were dismissed by Wittgenstein as meaningless theoretical constructions,while Anscombe's linguistic idealism and Putnam's internal realism,both anti-metaphysical interpretations,provided intellectual resources for understanding the naturalism and dialectic in Witgenstein's philosophy of language.An exploration of these two interpretations will help clarify the significant contributions Witgenstein made to the issue of language-reality relationship,one of the core topics in philosophy of language.