基于区块链技术的食品安全监管演化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Food Safety Regulation Based on Blockchain

文章分别考虑了食品安全监管机构采用和不采用区块链技术时监管部门和食品生产企业的收益变化,使用演化博弈方法动态分析了监管机构区块链技术采用策略及食品生产企业生产行为演化稳定策略,并得出均衡条件,最后进行了参数敏感性分析和数值模拟.研究发现:新技术被社会所接受的快慢受到诸多因素的影响,监管机构与食品生产企业之间的利益协调影响着区块链技术的实施效果和落地速度,区块链技术的采用也不一定能提高监管有效性;监管部门对食品生产企业低质量生产行为的惩罚力度大小对企业生产行为影响较大;在一定条件下,食品生产企业的生产行为与监管部门区块链采用策略无关.食品安全监管需要综合考虑食品生产企业的和监管机构的利益动机,对问责力度等进行合理的设计,避免导致食品监管策略失效,造成不良的社会影响.

In this paper,we examine the impact of Blockchain adoption on the in-come changes of regulatory authorities and food producers.Specifically,we employ an evolutionary game-theoretic approach to analyze the adoption strategy of Blockchain by regulatory agencies and the evolutionary stability strategy of production behavior by food producers.We derive equilibrium conditions and perform parameter sensitivity analysis and numerical simulations.Our findings underscore that the acceptance rate of novel technologies is a function of various factors,including interest coordination between regulatory agencies and food producers,which is critical in determining the implementation effect and landing speed of Blockchain.Furthermore,we find that the adoption of Blockchain may not necessarily enhance the effectiveness of regulation.The regulation department's punishment for low-quality production behavior of food production enterprises significantly influences the behavior of these enterprises.Under certain conditions,the production behavior of food production enterprises is independent of the regulatory authorities'Blockchain adoption strategy.Therefore,to design effective food safety regulations,it is imperative to comprehensively consider the interests and motives of food producers and regulatory agencies.The accountability level must be reasonably designed to avoid ineffective food regulation strategies and adverse social impacts.Our study provides insights that contribute to the literature on technological adoption and regulatory design.