摘要
企业违规行为严重影响资本市场的健康发展。如何有效抑制企业违规行为已成为学术界与实务界重点关注的问题。本文利用2018年实施的《银行业金融机构联合授信管理办法(试行)》作为准自然实验,检验联合授信制度对企业违规行为的监督治理效应。研究发现,联合授信制度能够有效抑制企业违规行为,且该效应集中于管理层未持股、无机构投资者进行实地调研的企业。进一步检验发现,联合授信制度显著降低了企业的违规倾向,但对稽查概率无显著影响。区分企业违规行为类型的检验表明,联合授信制度对企业信息披露违规行为与经营活动违规行为均能起到抑制作用。作用机制检验证实,联合授信制度通过降低企业过度融资、提升企业内部控制质量从而抑制企业违规行为。研究结论不仅为新兴市场中债权人的监督治理效应提供经验证据,也对促进资本市场健康发展具有启示意义。
Corporate fraud seriously hinder the healthy development of the capital market.How to effectively restrain corporate fraud has become a key concern in both academia and practice.This paper uses the Measures for the Administration of Joint Credit Granting of Banking and Financial Institutions(Trial)implemented in 2018 as a quasi-natural experiment,so as to test the supervision and governance effect of the joint credit system on corporate fraud.The study shows that the joint credit system significantly restrains the corporate fraud,and the inhibitory effect is more significant in corporates with no management shareholding or corporates with no institutional investors'site visit.Further tests show that the joint credit system significantly decreases the likelihood of corporate frauds,rather than the probability of fraud detection.The test of distinguishing the types of fraud shows that the joint credit system restrains both information disclosure fraud and business activities fraud.The mechanism test shows that the joint credit system restrains the corporate fraud through restraining corporates'over-financing and improving the quality of internal controls.The conclusions not only provide empirical evidence for the supervision and governance effect of creditors in emerging markets,but also have certain policy reference significance for promoting the healthy development of the capital market.
作者
沈璐
向锐
Shen Lu;Xiang Rui(Business School,Sichuan University)
出处
《经济评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2023年第6期124-139,共16页
Economic Review
基金
国家社会科学基金项目“中国情境下学者独董参与治理、影响机制与企业经济后果”(批准号:18BGL091)的资助。
关键词
联合授信
过度融资
内部控制
Joint Credit
Over-Financing
Internal Control