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考虑公平关切的航运物流区块链平台定价策略与契约协调

A Pricing Strategy and Contract Coordination of Shipping Logistics Blockchain Platforms Considering Fairness Concerns
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摘要 探究货代公司构建并应用航运物流区块链平台时,除了关注自身利润,还会关注物流链上利润分配的公平性问题。以船公司-航运物流区块链平台(货代公司)组成的二级供应链为研究对象,构建3种决策情形下的Stackelberg博弈模型,分析航运物流区块链平台具有公平关切特征时对航运物流供应链决策的影响,进而提出收益共享和区块链成本共担的契约协调,并用数值算例验证其有效性。研究发现:1)航运物流区块链平台的公平关切行为能够提高其在整个航运供应链的利润占比,缩小与船公司的利润差距;2)与公平中性相比,公平关切下的船公司制定的海运运费降低,与公平关切系数呈负相关;3)收益共享和区块链成本共担的契约协调比例在一定范围内能使航运物流区块链平台和船公司实现共赢,且公平关切下契约协调比例相比公平中性更严格。 To investigate the issue that freight forwarding companies focus on not only their profits but also the fairness of profit distribution in a logistics chain when constructing and applying a shipping logistics blockchain platform,this paper takes a secondary supply chain consisting of shipping companies and shipping logistics blockchain platforms(freight forwarders)as the object to establish a Stackelberg game model under three decision scenarios.The impact of shipping logistics blockchain platforms with fair concerns on shipping logistics supply chain decisions is analyzed.Also,contract coordination of profit sharing and blockchain cost sharing is further proposed and verified by numerical examples.Results indicate that:1)the fair concern behavior of shipping logistics blockchain platforms can increase the proportion of freight forwarding companies’profits in the entire shipping supply chain and narrow the profit gap with shipping companies;2)the oc-ean freight rates set by shipping companies with fairness concerns are negatively correlated with the fairness concern coefficient,which are lower than those with fairness neutrality;3)the contract coordination ratio of profit sharing and block-chain cost sharing can enable the shipping logistics blockchain platform and shipping companies to achieve a win-win result within a certain range,and the contract coordination ratio with fairness concerns is more strict than that with fairness neutrality.
作者 陈燕婷 李登峰 CHEN Yanting;LI Dengfeng(School of Economics and Management,Fuzhou University,Fuzhou 350108,China;School of Management and Economics,University of Electronic Science and Technology of China,Chengdu 611731,China)
出处 《工业工程》 北大核心 2023年第6期147-154,164,共9页 Industrial Engineering Journal
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(72071032)。
关键词 区块链 平台 公平关切 契约协调 blockchain platform fairness concerns contract coordination
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