从新加坡站台“南海仲裁案”看对冲战略的成败

Evaluations on the Hedging Strategies from the Standpoint of Singapore in the “South China Sea Arbitration Case”

面对中美战略竞争的不断加剧,中国周边地区的中小国家普遍采用对冲战略来应对体系结构变迁不确定性下的种种风险。从客观效果来看,一个国家的对冲行为能否维持其中间立场是决定其对冲战略成败的重要因素。在对冲的三边互动关系中,一个国家的对冲行为应当不能体现出过分地向某一国倾斜,否则将会引发其他大国的猜忌、怀疑乃至防备、回击。一个国家通过对冲行为来维持中间立场的成效受到三边互动中的对冲条件与对冲路径两个方面的影响。在对冲条件不充分的情况下,一个国家采取风险转嫁的对冲路径,将会瓦解自己的中间立场形象,从而招致对冲目标国的防备与回击。通过2016年新加坡站台“南海仲裁案”而导致中新关系出现低谷这一事件,长期在南海争端中扮演协调者的新加坡,因在对冲条件不充分的情况下,选择“联美遏华”的风险转嫁路线,导致新加坡中间立场的彻底瓦解,从而带来了对冲行为的失败。通过对冲成败机制的探讨,在中美战略竞争全面展开的当下,中国在处理周边国家关系上应当保持战略克制与积极有为的平衡,为周边国家的对冲战略留有余地,保持总体稳定的发展环境,不断夯实中国崛起的国际道义基础。

Facing the intensifying strategic competition between China and the United States,small and medium-sized countries in China’s neighborhood have generally adopted hedging strategies to cope with the risks associated with the uncertainty of structural changes.From the perspective of the effect of the middle position,whether a country’s hedging behavior can maintain its middle ground is an important factor in determining effects of its hedging strategy.In a hedging trilateral interactive relationship,the hedging behavior should not reflect an excessive tilt in favor of a certain country,otherwise it will trigger suspicion,doubts,and even defense and counterattack from other major countries.Therefore,the effectiveness in maintaining a middle ground through hedging behavior is affected by both hedging conditions and hedging paths in trilateral interactions.When hedging conditions are insufficient,the hedging path of risk transfer will undermine its middle-ground image,thus triggering defenses and counterattacks from the hedging target country.This paper takes Singapore’s stand on the“South China Sea Arbitration Case”in 2016 as a case study,pointing out that Singapore,which has long played the role of coordinator in the South China Sea disputes, has chosen the risk transfer route of “aligning the United States to contain China” because of the insufficient hedging conditions. This has led to the complete disintegration of its middle ground and thus the failure of its hedging behaviour. By exploring the mechanism of hedging effects, this paper argues that, facing a full-fledged strategic competition between China and the US, China should maintain a balance between strategic restraint and positive action in dealing with its neighbouring countries, and leave room for the hedging strategy of its neighbouring countries to maintain a generally stable development environment and to continue building up an international moral foundation for China’s rise.