权利的混合理论成立吗?

Can the Hybrid Theory of Rights Work?

权利的混合理论是与权利的意志论和利益论相竞争的权利概念理论。该理论的成立需要满足以下两个检验标准:(1)它提出来的权利概念要与权利的通常用法相符;(2)它要防止权利被工具化。混合理论能避免意志论和多数利益论各自面临的困境,这是其理论优势。然而,一方面,混合理论也会像利益论一样识别出过多的权利,以及它扭曲了权利和义务之间的对应关系,所以无法满足第一个标准;另一方面,混合理论最终亦难逃脱把权利工具化的结局,因而也没有满足第二个标准。概言之,权利的混合理论是不成立的。

The hybrid theory of rights is a theory concerning the concept of rights,which competes with the will theory of rights and the interest theory of rights.The success of this theory must meet the following two criteria:(1)the concept of rights proposed by the theory should accord with the common usage of rights;(2)the theory should prevent the instrumentalization of rights.The attraction of the theory is that it avoids many difficulties faced by the will theory or the interest theory.However,the hybrid theory fails to meet the first criterion because,like the interest theory,it recognizes too many rights,and also distorts the correlation between rights and duties.Besides,the hybrid theory also fails to meet the second criterion since it ends up instrumentalizing rights.Generally,the hybrid theory of rights cannot work.