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双重规制下空气污染治理机制设计:一个委托代理模型

The Design of Air Pollution Governance Mechanism Under Dual Regulation:A Principal-Agency Model
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摘要 排污规制是空气污染治理的重要工具。企业不仅受到环境规制,还受到经济规制,而经济规制会影响环境规制的效果。当企业既污染空气又垄断产品市场时,将受到环保部门和经济部门的双重规制,两部门的规制目标存在冲突。经济部门要求企业增加产出并降低产品价格,但增加产出会增加空气污染。环保部门要求企业投资环保设备或减少产出以降低污染物排放,这会推高产品价格或降低产量,与经济部门规制目标相冲突。利用委托代理模型,基于共同代理理论,考虑两部门的规制互动,从理论上研究双重规制下的空气污染治理机制设计发现:两部门独立设计规制政策会产生被规制企业过度激励问题,导致社会福利损失。最优规制制度设计要求两部门合作,纠正因过度激励导致的社会福利损失。但当前的空气污染联防联控政策较注重地区间的协调,对经济部门和环保部门独立设计的规制政策目标存在冲突的问题关注较少,因此还需加强规制部门间合作,解决双重规制导致的规制协调失灵问题。 Emission regulation is an important tool for air pollution control enterprises are not only subject to environmental regulation,but also to economic regulation,which affects the effectiveness of environmental regulation.When firms both pollute the air and monopolise the market for their products,they are subject to both environmental and economic regulation,with conflicting regulatory objectives.The economic sector requires firms to increase output and lower prices,but increased output increases air pollution.The environmental sector requires firms to invest in environmental protection equipment or reduce output to reduce pollutant emissions,which will push up prices or reduce output,conflicting with the regulatory objectives of the economic sector.Using the principal-agent model,based on the theory of common agency and considering the regulatory interactions between the two sectors,this paper does the theoretical study of the design of air pollution control mechanisms under dual regulation.We finds that the independent design of regulatory policies by the two sectors will create an over-incentive problem for the regulated firms,leading to a loss of social welfare.The optimal regulatory system design requires the two sectors to cooperate to correct the social welfare loss due to over-incentives.The current air pollution prevention and control policy focuses more on inter-regional coordination,and there are conflicting objectives of regulatory policies designed independently by the economic and environmental sectors,so there is a need to strengthen cooperation between the regulatory sectors to solve the problem of regulatory coordination failure caused by dual regulation.
作者 佟健 宋小宁 TONG Jian;SONG Xiao-ning
出处 《产经评论》 北大核心 2023年第6期25-32,共8页 Industrial Economic Review
基金 广东省基础与应用基础研究基金项目“国家治理的微观作用机理研究:政治周期、新预算法与企业税负”(项目编号:2020A1515010552,项目负责人:宋小宁) 广东省基础与应用基础研究基金项目“中央嵌入的地方协同:都市圈协同促统一大市场的微观机理研究”(项目编号:2023A1515010700,项目负责人:宋小宁) 广东省基础与应用基础研究基金项目“国家双碳战略下促进企业环境治理的管理层激励制度研究”(项目编号:2022A1515011799,项目负责人:卢锐) 国家自然科学青年基金项目“企业技术创新伙伴的空间选择:事实、机理与效应”(项目编号:72303047,项目负责人:李建成)。
关键词 空气污染 环境规制 经济规制 委托代理模型 air pollution environmental regulation economic regulation principal-agency model
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