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基于动态非合作博弈超效率DEA的成本补偿激励方法研究 被引量:1

Cost Compensation Method for Incentives Based on Dynamic Non-cooperative Game and Super-efficiency DEA
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摘要 实践中,管理者常面临的一个问题是如何通过成本补偿的方式有效地激励决策单元(DMU)主动改进绩效,这种问题常见于垄断行业和公益性服务行业的成本监审和价格形成机制中。现有成本补偿激励研究对DMU的正向激励不足,同时也未考虑到DMU间在面临利益关系时常出现的非合作博弈关系。因此,本文将动态非合作博弈与超效率DEA相结合,提出一种具有双向激励效果的动态博弈超效率DEA算法,论证了算法的收敛性、最优解具有唯一性且是纳什均衡点,并将所提出的方法应用到2016-2019年我国某电网集团25个省级电网企业中,验证了方法的有效性。研究结果表明:1)各地区电网企业的运营效率有显著差异,效率改进动力不强;2)本文提出的成本补偿方案能够同时对不同效率表现的DMU产生正向激励或负向激励,论证了本文方法有助于加强DMU主动改进绩效的动机。研究进一步丰富和拓展了成本补偿激励问题的DEA理论研究,为相关管理者提供了一个有效的管理工具。 In practice,a common problem faced by managers is how to motivate decision-making units(DMU)to improve their performance by means of cost compensation.It is especially common in the problems of cost supervision and price mechanism in the monopoly industry and public welfare service industry.The existing cost compensation studies do not provide sufficient positive incentives for effect DMUs,and also do not consider the non-cooperative game relationship that often occurs among DMUs in the face of interests.Therefore,dynamic non-cooperative game is combined with super-efficiency data envelopment analysis(DEA)and a dynamic game super-efficiency DEA algorithm with bidirectional incentive effect is proposed.The convergence of the algorithm is proved and the optimal solution is a unique Nash equilibrium point.The proposed method is applied to 25 provincial-level power grid enterprises of a power grid group in China from 2016 to 2019,and the effective⁃ness of the method is verified.The results of the case study show that:1)The operating efficiency of power grid enterprises in different regions is significantly different,and the motivation of performance improvement is not strong;2)The proposed cost compensation scheme can generate positive or negative incentives for DMU with different performance,and the proposed method is helpful to strengthen the motivation of DMUs to actively improve their performance.It further enriches the DEA theoretical research of cost compensation for incentives and provides an effective management tool for relevant managers in this study.
作者 戴前智 徐晓迟 雷西洋 赵茜 DAI Qian-zhi;XU Xiao-chi;LEI Xi-yang;ZHAO Qian(School of Economics,Hefei University of Technology,Hefei 230009,China;School of Management,Hefei University of Technology,Hefei 230009,China;State Grid Energy Research Institute Co.,LTD,Beijing 102209,China)
出处 《中国管理科学》 CSCD 北大核心 2023年第12期185-192,共8页 Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(72171072,72271081,71801075) 国家社会科学基金资助重大项目(18ZDA064) 安徽省哲学社会科学规划项目(AHSKY2017D78) 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(JZ2022HGTB0261)。
关键词 成本补偿 非合作博弈 数据包络分析 激励 绩效改进 cost compensation non-cooperative game data envelopment analysis incentive performance improvement
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