相互阻击还是相互克制?平台多点竞争策略研究

Mutual Resistance or Mutual Forbearance?Study on Platforms Multimarket Competition Strategy

近年来,平台跨市场经营频现,平台多点竞争引发社会关注。本文基于Hotelling模型构建了一个由主副市场、平台、商家、消费者构成的多点竞争体系,研究平台在主副市场中不实施多点竞争、实施多点竞争不附带排他性条款、实施多点竞争并附带排他性条款三种情形下的策略选择。研究结果表明:(1)与传统的多点竞争理论相悖,平台多点竞争并不必然导致平台间相互克制,能否导致相互克制取决于平台实施多点竞争是否附带排他性条款。(2)平台的最优多点竞争策略取决于平台交叉网络外部性以及在主营市场中赋予用户的固定效用。(3)平台实施多点竞争不附带排他性条款情形下,用户剩余及社会总福利最高;而在不实施多点竞争情形下,用户剩余和社会总福利最低。

Platforms cross-market operation has become more and more popular in recent years,and this puts the issue of platforms multimarket competition under the spotlight.Based on the Hotelling model,a multimarket competition system consisting of markets(a main market and a subsidiary market),platforms,sellers,and consumers,is buit and the competitive strategy selection of platforms among three options is analyzed:no multimarket competition in both the main and the subsidiary market,multimarket competition without exclusive contract,and multimarket competition with exclusive contract.The following findings are derived by the analysis.(1)Departing from the traditional multimarket competition theory,platforms multimarket competition does not necessarily lead to mutual forbearance between platforms.Specifically,mutual forbearance depends on whether platforms choose multimarket competition with exclusive contract or not.(2)The optimal multimarket competition strategy of the platforms is contingent on the cross-network externalities and the intrinsic benefit that platforms provide to users in the main market.(3)When platforms choose multimarket competition without exclusive contract,the user surplus and total social welfare are the highest.The user surplus and total social welfare are the lowest when platforms choose no multimarket competition.