再论“数字人权”的解构与追问

A Further Study of the Deconstruction and Inquiry of“Digital Human Rights”

“数字人权”论争至今,正题与反题的交锋依次聚焦第四代人权、人权的道德基础、人权性质三个争议点。从逻辑顺序来说,判断一项权利是否属于人权,首先要看基于人的本原属性能否推导得出,否则无所谓第几代人权或人权新特征的问题。在人权本原看来,“数字人性”不是人之本性,倘若把“数字人性”视为人权的人性根基,则会导致主体虚化、形态变异、义务扩张的伦理危机。就人权结构而言,“数字人权”的价值证立欠缺最低限度的基础性,政治决断与学术论证的脱离会导致科学性存疑,对“三元结构”的突破不利于规范体系的稳定性。“数字人权”话语表达的逻辑、理论和知识生产存在着不自洽、不自信、不自主的缺陷,即因果倒置、路径依赖和重复生产。因此,对于数字科技与人权的复杂性关系,仍需从人权本原、人权结构、人权话语等多元视角继续追问。

So far the debate on“digital human rights”has focused on three controversial aspects,namely,the fourth-generation human rights,the moral foundations of human rights,and the nature of human rights.Logically speaking,to judge whether a right is a human right depends first on whether it can be deduced from the original attributes of human beings;otherwise,it doesn’t matter how many generations of human rights there are or whether human rights have new features.In the view of the origin of human rights,“digital humanity”is not the nature of human beings,and if it is regarded as the humanity foundation of human rights,it will lead to the ethical crisis of the vacuity of the subjects,the variation of the forms,and the expansion of obligations.In terms of the structure of human rights,the value evidence of“digital human rights”lacks the minimum foundation;the separation of political decision and academic proof leads to doubts about scientificity;and the breakthrough of the“triad structure”is not conducive to the stability of the normative system.In addition,the logic,theory and knowledge production of the discourse expression of“digital human rights”are characterized by a lack of self-consistency,self-confidence and autonomy,that is,inversion of cause and effect,path dependence and repetitive production.Therefore,the complex relationship between digital science and technology and human rights still needs to be further pursued from the perspectives of the origin,the structure and the discourse of human rights.