环境管理体系认证下企业绿色技术创新动态策略研究

Research on Dynamic Strategies for Enterprises Green Technology Innovationunder Environmental Management System Certification

以环境管理体系认证为背景,基于有限理性假设,引入政府研发补助、审查奖励等外生参数及自研收益、外购收益、审查成本和绿色声誉评价等内生参数,构建认证企业和第三方认证机构的演化博弈模型,分析绿色技术创新过程中双方的动态策略选择以及达到均衡稳定策略的条件。利用仿真模拟不同情形下,系统演化路径和均衡点变化。研究表明,随着时间的演化,企业选择“自主绿色技术创新”,第三方认证机构选择“宽松审查”的策略组合为系统均衡稳定状态。系统演化速度受双方策略选择初始概率和系统经济参数的影响,但是无论主体策略选择概率和参数如何变化,双方的稳定策略不变。

Based on the bounded rationality hypothesis,a new evolutionary game model of certified enterprises and third-party certification bodies was constructed on the background of environmental management system certification.In the model,exogenous parameters such as go-vernment R&D subsidies and review incentives were mainly considered,as well as endogenous parameters such as self-research benefits,outsourcing benefits,review costs and green reputation evaluation,to analyze the dynamic strategy choices of both parties in the process of green technology innovation,as well as the conditions for achieving balanced and stable strategies.In addition,simulations were used to simulate the evolutionary path and equilibrium point changes of the system under different scenarios.The results found that,as time evolving,the strategy combination of"independent green technology innovation"by the enterprises and"lenient review"by the third-party certification bodies is the equilibrium stable state of the system.The evolution speed of the system’s stable strategies is influenced by the initial proportion of main stra-tegy choices and economic parameters selection.No matter how the proportion and parameters values changed,the final strategy decisions of both parties will not be changed.