摘要
由于债券信用评级收费信息不公开,因此评级收费如何影响信用评级合理性一直是个谜。基于对信用评级收费和评级合理性的实验研究,本文发现:评级收费与过度评级之间呈倒U型关系,即较高的信用评级收费会诱导评级机构的过度评级,但是更高的评级收费可能导致评级机构更加谨慎,降低过度评级。监管能对过度评级现象起显著遏制作用:随着监管强度的提高,过度评级现象减少。而且,监管的加强会提高评级机构的违约成本,从而使得评级收费对评级合理性的影响拐点右移,即更高的评级收费才能弥补因监管加强增加的违约成本。也就是说,较严的监管不仅会直接遏制过度评级现象,也会造成评级机构更加关注预期损失,降低评级意见购买的可能。本文的研究为监管部门规范评级机构的信用评级收费及提高其信用评级合理性提供了参考和借鉴,评级收费的公开化和透明化有利于信用评级的合理性。
Since credit rating fees are not publicly disclosed,the effect of rating fees on credit rating decisions has long been something of a mystery.Based on an experimental study of credit ratings and rating rationality,this paper finds that there is an inverted U-type relationship between rating fees and over-rating.Higher credit rating fees can induce over-rating by rating agencies,though they can also lead to more cautious behavior by heightening rating agency concerns over potential loss of business.The existence of substantial penalties,such as curbs on conducting business,for example,has played a significant role in suppressing excessive ratings.The higher the expected penalty amount,the greater the potential cost of opportunistic behavior by a rating agency.The study also could serve as a reference for regulatory authorities in supervising credit rating charges and improving the reasonableness of credit ratings.It also calls for greater transparency in setting rating charges.
作者
朱松
黄海杰
许静静
ZHU Song;HUANG Haijie;XU Jingjing(Department of Accounting,School of Economics and Management,East China Normal University)
出处
《金融市场研究》
2023年第12期81-94,共14页
Financial Market Research
基金
国家自然科学基金“制度环境、代际传承与家族企业技术创新研究”(71802084)
教育部人文社科基金“国内信用评级机构的竞争策略对其市场地位的影响研究”(18YJA630156)
上海市“科技创新行动计划”软科学研究项目“信用评级收费、评级监管与评级意见购买行为——基于实验研究的证据”(23692107500)的资助。
关键词
评级收费
信用评级合理性
过度评级
监管强度
实验研究
Rating Fees
Regulatory Intensity
Over-rating
Rationality of Credit Rating
Experimental Research