摘要
建立由政府、制造商和公平关切零售商构成的三阶段Stackelberg博弈模型,在消费者效用视角下,运用动态博弈理论和非线性消费者效用函数构建政府不补贴、政府补贴制造商和政府补贴消费者三种模型,求解不同补贴策略下的最优决策结果并对比分析,研究政府不同补贴策略下零售商公平关切和渠道竞争对双渠道绿色供应链最优决策、消费者效用和社会福利的影响.研究结果表明:当政府不补贴和补贴消费者时,零售商公平关切增强会降低产品批发价格、销售价格、绿色度和消费者效用,当政府补贴制造商时,产品绿色度最高,零售商公平关切不会影响产品销售价格、绿色度、社会福利和消费者效用.政府补贴会提高批发价格和销售价格,当政府不补贴时,产品的线上直销价格等于批发价格,低于线下零售价格,政府补贴后,线上直销价格高于批发价格且低于线下零售价格;当补贴消费者时,产品批发价格和销售价格最高.零售商公平关切系数一定时,渠道竞争也会降低产品绿色度,且政府不补贴和补贴制造商情形下的批发价格会随着渠道竞争的增强而提高.
A three-stage Stackelberg game model consisting of government,manufacturer and equity-concerned retailer was established.From the perspective of consumer utility,dynamic game theory and nonlinear consumer utility function were used to construct three models,namely government non-subsidy model,government subsidy manufacturer model and government subsidy consumer model.The optimal decision results under different subsidy strategies were solved and compared.The influence of retailers'fair concern and channel competition on optimal decision-making,consumer utility and social welfare of dual-channel green supply chain under different government subsidy strategies is studied.The results show that when the government does not subsidize and subsidize consumers,the retailer's equity concern will reduce the wholesale price,sales price,greenness and consumer utility.When the government subsidizes manufacturers,the product's greenness is the highest,and the retailer's equity concern will not affect the product's sales price,greenness,social welfare and consumer utility.Government subsidies will increase the wholesale price and sales price.When the government does not provide subsidies,the online direct selling price of products is equal to the wholesale price and lower than the offline retail price;after the government subsidies,the online direct selling price is higher than the wholesale price and lower than the offline retail price.When consumers are subsidized,the wholesale price and sales price of products are the highest.When the fairness concern coefficient of retailers is constant,channel competition will also reduce the greenness of products,and the wholesale price will increase with the enhancement of channel competition when the government does not subsidize or subsidize manufacturers.
作者
潘金涛
王道平
田雨
PAN Jintao;WANG Daoping;TIAN Yu(School of Economics and Management,University of Science and Technology Beijing,Beijing 100083)
出处
《系统科学与数学》
CSCD
北大核心
2023年第12期3243-3262,共20页
Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71871017)资助课题。
关键词
公平关切
消费者效用
政府补贴
社会福利
Fairness-concerns
consumer utility
government subsidies
social welfare