基于演化博弈的自贸区监管与投资策略分析

Analysis of Free Trade Zone Supervision and Investment Strategy Based on Evolutionary Game

近年来,自贸区的数量逐渐增多,自贸区的平稳健康运行,成为关乎国家经济发展的头等大事。为了构建健康的自贸区生态系统,了解不同因素在自贸区策略选择中的作用,本文运用演化博弈理论进行建模,使用Matlab软件进行仿真分析,分析不同情形下的演化状态,同时单独研究监管能力、惩罚力度以及补贴力度对演化系统的影响情况。研究表明:在一定条件下,监管水平的提高会明显促进博弈各方采取积极策略;加大对企业的惩罚力度会对博弈各方产生威慑,进而显著性延缓企业采取消极策略的时间;在一定情形下,博弈各方会达到最佳的演化平衡状态,这时对关键因素进行细微调整,可以达到事半功倍的效果。

In recent years,the number of free trade zones has gradually increased,and the smooth and healthy operation of free trade zones has become a top priority for the country’s economic development.In or-der to build a healthy free trade zone ecosystem and understand the role of different factors in the choice of free trade zone strategies,this article uses evolutionary game theory to model,and then uses matlab soft-ware to perform simulation analysis to analyze the evolutionary state under different situations,and at the same time separately Study the impact of regulatory capabilities,penalties,and subsidies on the evolution-ary system.Studies have shown that under certain conditions,the improvement of the level of supervision will obviously promote the positive strategies of all parties in the game;increasing the punishment of en-terprises will deter all parties in the game,which will significantly delay the time for enterprises to adopt negative strategies;Under the circumstances,the parties to the game will reach the best evolutionary equilibrium.At this time,minor adjustments to the key factors can achieve a multiplier effect.