基于博弈论的减税减费作用于地方债务风险的机制研究

Research on the Mechanism of Tax Reduction and Fee Reduction on Local Debt Risk Based on Game Theory

减税降费措施在我国落地实施的十几年中已经取得了显著的成效。然而,在减税降费的实践中,也暴露出了一些问题。在社会经济面临下行风险时,地方政府面临着税率降低、“免、抵、退”税情况增多等导致短期财政收入下降的风险。由于政府存在财政支出刚性,收支缺口增加,地方政府一边面对上涨的赤字,一边又在扩大用于提振经济发展、填补收支缺口等的债务规模。这样一来,地方政府债务规模占财政收入的比率会上升。偿债能力减弱、债务规模增加,债务危机风险提高。目前,我国部分地区债务率已达新高,需要及时采取预防措施。因此,要了解减税降费的作用机制。本文以博弈论视角构建模型,推导了减税减费作用于地方债务风险的机制,并提出了对策建议。

The measures to reduce taxes and fees have achieved significant results in China over the past de-cade.However,in the practice of reducing taxes and fees,some problems have also been exposed.When facing downward risks in the social economy,local governments face the risk of reducing tax rates,increasing tax exemptions,credits,and refunds,which can lead to a decrease in short-term fiscal revenue.Due to the gov-ernment's rigid fiscal expenditure,the income and expenditure gap has increased.Local governments are fac-ing rising deficits while also expanding the debt scale used to boost economic development and fill income and expenditure gaps.In this way,the proportion of local government debt to fiscal revenue will increase.The ability to repay debts has weakened,the scale of debts has increased,and the risk of debt crisis has in-creased.At present,Chinas debt ratio has reached a new high,and timely preventive measures need to be taken.Firstly,it is necessary to understand the mechanism of tax reduction and fee reduction.This article constructs a model from the perspective of game theory,deduces the mechanism of tax reduction and fee reduc-tion on local debt risk,and proposes countermeasures and suggestions.