党建引领自律:党建入章与国企高管在职消费

Party Building Leading Self-discipline:Party Building into Articles of Association and Managerial Perks in State-owned Enterprises

党建工作要求写入公司章程是把加强党的领导和完善公司治理统一起来、建设中国特色现代企业制度的重要举措。文章通过手工搜集2015年至2019年我国A股国有上市公司“党建入章”的数据,实证检验了“党建入章”对国有企业高管在职消费的影响。研究发现:(1)“党建入章”能够抑制国有企业高管在职消费行为;(2)对于公司治理水平较低的国有企业,“党建入章”对高管在职消费行为的抑制作用更加明显;(3)异质性分析表明,“党建入章”对国有企业高管在职消费行为的抑制作用在商业类国有企业、市场化程度较高地区、文化松紧度较高地区中更强。本研究首次从“党建入章”角度考察国有企业委托代理行为的影响机制,这夯实了我国国有企业改革的理论基础,为实现“党建入章”与公司治理机制的有效融合提供了初步的理论解释和证据支持,同时也为如何更好地规制国有企业高管在职消费行为奠定了政策基础。

“Party Building into Articles of Association”(PBIAA)is an important measure to combine the strengthening of CPC s leadership and the improvement of corporate governance,and to build a modern enterprise system with Chinese characteristics.This study collects the A-share SOEs data of PBIAA for the period of 2015-2019 and then investigates how PBIAA affects managerial perks and the moderating effect of media coverage on the above relationship.The results show that:(1)PBIAA inhibits managerial perks in China s SOEs;(2)the inhibitory effect of PBIAA on managerial perks in China s SOEs is more prominent when the level of corporate governance of China s SOEs is lower;(3)heterogeneity analysis shows that the inhibitory effect of PBIAA on managerial perks in China s SOEs is more prominent when the corporate is commercial SOEs,the region is more marketable and the cultural network is tighter.This paper investigates the influencing mechanism of SOEs principal-agent behavior from the perspective of PBIAA for the first time,consolidates the theoretical basis for the reform of China s SOEs,provides a preliminary theoretical explanation and evidence support for the effective integration of PBIAA and corporate governance,and also lays a foundation of policy-making for better regulating managerial perks in China s SOEs.