乡镇执法中的党政协同模式选择及机制改革

On the Selection of Party-government Coordination Mode and Mechanism Reform in Township Law Enforcement

当下乡镇执法中的联动型执法具有临时性的缺陷,派驻式执法归属不明,网格化执法规格低。执法下沉的实践困境源于权力下沉先行而组织规范滞后的制度落差、条线部门转型属地治理部门的改制阻力以及县乡之间的体制差异。党参与乡镇执法缘由在于党政体制决定因素与基层执法的权威依托,党政协同执法模式选择则缘于乡镇的“一元二体”结构。完善乡镇执法应以适应性构造作为执法组织制度,以权力调适作为执法协调制度,以共同考评作为人事评价制度,以同责分置作为协同责任制度。

At present, the linkage law enforcement in township law enforcement has temporary defects, the ownership of stationed law enforcement is unclear, and the grid law enforcement specifications are low. The practical dilemma of law enforcement is due to the institutional gap between the decentralization of power and the lag of organizational norms, the transformation of line departments and the resistance to the restructuring of territorial governance departments, and the institutional differences between counties and townships. The reason for the party's participation in township law enforcement lies in the determinants of the party and government system and the authority dependence of township law enforcement, and the choice of the party-government collaborative law enforcement model is due to the“one-unit-two-aspects”structure of townships and towns. To improve township law enforcement, the adaptive structure should be taken as the law enforcement organization system, the power adjustment should be used as the law enforcement coordination system, the joint evaluation should be used as the personnel evaluation system, and the same responsibility should be separated as the collaborative responsibility system.