论康德许可法则的独立地位及其授权

OnKKant's Permissive Law and Its Authorization

康德在《道德形而上学》中把许可法则当作实践理性的公设,由此拓展了实践理性的应用。在此作品之前的著作中,康德将许可法则作为禁止法则的例外。对此已有的解释的核心问题在于,这是否构成了康德对于许可法则的解释的转变。然而,一方面虽然康德通过对相关术语的澄清来凸显这种转变,但这还不足以为许可法则的独立地位提供完整的基础;另一方面许可法则被描述为一种授权性的法则,据此我们对于选择的客体拥有一个权利。但这种解释混淆了许可法则授权的内容,因而也忽视了主体之间对彼此授权内容的同意。许可法则独特的授权内容与规范对象的范围体现了主体之间的同意的限度。

In The Metaphysics of Morals,Kant regards the permissive law as the postulate of practical reason,thus expanding the application of practical reason.Inthe writings preceding this work,Kant tookkthe permissive law as an exception tothe law of prohibition.The question at the heart of the many interpretations that have been made of this distinction is whether it constitutes a shift in Kant's interpretation of the permissive law.However,on the one hand,although Kant highlights this shift byclarifying therelevant terms,this is not enough to provide a complete basis forthe independent status of the law of permission.On the other hand,the permissive lawis described as a law ofauthorization by which we have a right over objects of choice.But they confuse what the permissive law authorizes thus ignore the consent of subjects to whateachother authorizes.The scope of the unique authorized content and normativeobjects oftthe permissive law reflect thelimitsofconsent between thesubjects.