大股东“掏空”动机与企业“存贷双高”之谜

Tunneling Behaviors of Large Shareholders and the Phenomenon of“High Deposits and Loans”

文章以2007—2019年中国A股上市公司为样本,从第二类代理问题视角检验我国企业“存贷双高”之谜的内在逻辑及其治理机制。研究发现:大股东两权分离度越高,公司“存贷双高”问题越突出,大股东两权分离度每提高一个单位,企业出现“存贷双高”的概率增加6.33%,表明大股东“掏空”动机可能是企业“存贷双高”的驱动因素;机制分析表明,上述影响在大股东融资压力较大时更强,在上市公司融资约束较低时更强,为公司“存贷双高”是大股东“掏空”动机所致提供了进一步证据;以卖空压力测量外部治理、以内部控制质量测量内部治理研究发现,有效的外部治理和内部治理机制能够抑制大股东“掏空”动机驱动的企业“存贷双高”;“存贷双高”会对公司财务绩效和可持续发展产生严重负面影响。研究结论为我国上市公司“存贷双高”之谜提供了第二类代理问题视角的解释和证据,对于防范与治理实体经济运行面临的潜在风险具有借鉴意义。

This paper examines the internal logic and governance mechanism of the“high deposits and loans”mystery of Chinese enterprises from the perspective of type II agency problem,using Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2019 as a sample.We find that:(1)the higher the degree of separation between the two rights of major shareholders,the more prominent the problem of“high deposits and loans”in the company,for each unit increase in the separation,the probability of“high deposits and loans”increases by 6.33%,indicating that the motivation of major shareholders'tunneling may be a driving factor for the“high deposits and loans”;(2)the mechanism behind the effect shows that this effect mainly stems from major shareholders'financing pressure,and only works when the financing constraint of companies is low;(3)further,by measuring external governance by short-sell pressure and internal governance with internal control quality,effective external and internal governance can suppress the“high deposits and loans”of companies driven by large shareholders'short-sell motives;(4)finally,“high deposits and loans”have serious negative effects on the financial performance and sustainable development of companies.Our findings contribute to explaining the reasons for the increased risk of the real economy in China,and provide empirical evidence for the mystery of“high deposits and loans”.