前景理论视角下废旧动力电池回收监管演化博弈分析

Evolutionary game analysis of waste power battery recyclingsupervision from the perspective of prospect theory

废旧动力电池具有较强的负外部性,违背了新能源汽车设计的初衷。为促进废旧动力电池有效回收,将前景理论与演化博弈论耦合,综合考虑政府、企业(汽车生产)和公众之间的利益,促使政府和公众对企业进行共同监督,构建三方博弈模型。针对初始意愿、罚款组成、风险态度系数和损失规避系数的不同情况,进行模拟数值仿真,并结合现实中废旧动力电池的认识度、奖惩机制和盈利信心进行分析。研究表明:提高公众或政府的初始监督意愿,可以促进企业回收废旧动力电池;当企业的回收策略为亏损时,提高企业对公众的补偿金额、降低企业的风险态度系数和损失规避系数,可以促进企业积极回收;在废旧动力电池回收过程中,共同监督的效果优于单独监督。

Used power batteries have strong negative externalities,contrary to the original intention of new energy vehicle design.To promote the effective recycling of used power batteries,the prospect theory is coupled with evolutionary game theory,and the interests of the government,enterprises(automobile production)and the public are thoroughly considered so that the enterprises can be jointly supervised by the government and the public and a tripartite game model can be developed.Analogue numerical simulations are conducted for different scenarios of initial willingness,penalty composition,risk attitude coefficient and loss aversion coefficient,and in relation to awareness,reward and punishment mechanisms and profitability confidence of used power batteries in reality,analysis is made.Our study shows increasing the initial supervisory willingness of the public or the government promotes the recycling of used power batteries by enterprises;when the recycling strategy of enterprises is losing money,active recycling by enterprises is enhanced by increasing the amount of compensation from enterprises to the public,and decreasing the risk attitude coefficients and loss aversion coefficients of enterprises;in the recycling process of used power batteries,joint supervision is superior to individual supervision.