外部投资者参与创新合作视角下研发补贴的最优边界问题研究

The Optimal Boundary of R&D Subsidies for Promoting R&D Cooperation Involving External Investors

创新驱动战略实施过程中,提高地方政府研发补贴政策的效力至关重要。本文基于研发补贴对企业产生的双重“认证效应”,构建了地方政府、研发企业和外部投资者之间的随机演化博弈模型。通过模型求解,得出了主体策略演化稳定时研发补贴的有效边界条件。以2019年我国12个省份的601家创业板上市公司数据为样本,选取北京市作为研发补贴政策标杆区域,对其他省份研发补贴的效力进行了横向比较。研究结果表明:地方政府发放的研发补贴对企业和投资者选择研发和投资策略不具有决定性作用,但研发补贴会显著影响两类主体策略选择概率的收敛速度和稳定性;以北京市作为标杆区域进行横向分析时,各省份均存在研发补贴的有效边界,且各省份研发补贴效力呈现方向性差异。三类区域具体如下:第一类如安徽省和四川省,研发补贴缺口大,仍可继续追加;第二类如广东省,其与北京市的研发补贴效力趋近;第三类如湖北省、山东省和河南省,存在研发补贴“冗余”现象。

In the process of implementing the innovation-driven strategy,it is crucial to improve the effectiveness of R&D subsidies of local governments.Based on the dual"certification effect"of R&D subsidies on firms,this paper proposes a model of stochastic evolutionary game among three participants:local governments,R&D firms and investors.By solving the model,we derive the effective boundary conditions of R&D subsidies during the stable evolution of the participants'strategies.Drawing upon the data of 601 ChiNext listed companies in 12 regions in 2019 with Beijing as the benchmark area for R&D subsidy policies,this paper compares the effectiveness of R&D subsidies in other regions.The results show that:the R&D subsidies issued by the local governments do not play a decisive role in the choice of R&D and investment strategies by enterprises and investors,but will significantly affect the convergence speed and stability of their strategy selection probabilities.Benchmarked against Beijing,other regions show an effective boundary for R&D subsidies,and the effectiveness varies directionally from region to region.To be specific,R&D subsidies are insufficient in regions like Anhui and Sichuan,at the same level as Beijing in regions like Guangdong,and redundant in regions like Hubei,Shandong and Henan.