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商业银行董事与高管中长期激励机制的底层逻辑与优化路径 被引量:1

The underlying logic and optimization path of the mid-to-long-term incentive mechanism for directors and senior executives of commercial banks
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摘要 商业银行董事和高管中长期激励机制设计的底层逻辑,以委托人和代理人“激励相容”为核心目标,强调“效率优先、兼顾公平”的指导原则,高度重视激励机制所具有的风险控制功能,中长期激励机制在培养企业家精神和吸引、保留一流金融入才方面发挥着关键性作用,看重股权激励作为最主要的中长期激励机制所具有的重要价值。 The underlying logic governing the design of medium-to-longterm incentive mechanisms for directors and senior executives of commercial banks is to take incentive compatibility as the core goal and"giving priority to efficiency with due consideration to fairness"as the guiding principle,and to attach great importance to its risk control function,its key role in cultivating entrepreneurship and attracting and retaining first-class financial talents,and the important valueof equity incentives.
作者 吴卫军 陈波 David Wu;Chen Bo(National Financial Services Industry leader,Deloitte China;Deloitte China Corporate Governance Centre)
出处 《中国银行业》 2023年第12期76-79,6,共5页 China Banking
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