发达国家对发展中国家债务减免的政治经济学分析——资本逻辑和参与约束

The Political Economy of Debt Relief:Capital Logic and Participation Constraint

本文从资本逻辑和参与约束的角度研究了发达国家对发展中国家债务减免的动机和制约因素。资本逻辑要求债务减免主要以服务发达国家的私人资本输出为目的,对增强债务国的偿债能力效果有限,而且还会加剧国际不平等,因此往往难以满足参与约束。重债穷国倡议和多边债务减免倡议减债方案即便在本质上仍体现了资本逻辑,但是在新自由主义发展理念和规则化减免方式的掩护下其也能满足参与约束并得以顺利实施,因而也被发达国家奉为国际范例。本文认为既要借鉴重债穷国倡议和多边债务减免倡议方案规则化的经验,也应警惕隐藏在技术细节中的资本逻辑,推动债务减免向有利于发展中国家的方向发展。

This paper examines the motives and constraints of sovereign debt relief from the perspective of capital logic and participation constraints.Under the logic of capital,debt relief is used as an important means of creating favorable conditions for private capital export and mitigating the crisis of excessive accumulation.However,if the logic of capital is too obvious,debt relief will not be able to meet the participation constraints and it will be difficult to obtain sufficient support and participation.The reputed HIPC-MDRI scheme successfully achieves broad participation by masking the logic of capital with neoliberal economics.This paper argues that the rule-based nature of the HIPC-MDRI scheme should be praised,but the logic of capital is still hidden in technical details.