重整中“债转股”对证券虚假陈述责任的影响

The Influence of“Debt-to-Equity Swap”in Reorganization on the Liability of Misrepresentation on Securities Market

债券投资者在发行人重整程序中自愿选择“债转股”的,无论是否在重整中实现全部的债权清偿,“债转股”实施完毕后,投资者面对发行人已不存在法律意义上的损失,投资者无权追究重整后发行人的证券虚假陈述赔偿责任。因重整与证券监管的价值目标相异,重整文书认定的情况不宜直接作为认定发行人虚假陈述的证据。发行人虚假陈述的认定,须经过“重大性”标准的审视。债券投资者根据公允的转股价格核定未在重整中实现全部债权清偿的,有权向第三人担保人请求清偿,或者主张“看门人”承担相对独立的虚假陈述责任。发行人重整程序启动后计算的利息,以及违约债券引发的逾期利息、违约金、实现债权的合理费用等在“看门人”的赔偿责任范围内。

If a bond investor voluntarily chooses“debt-to-equity swap”in the issuer’s reorganization procedure,regardless of whether all creditor’s rights are satisfied in the reorganization,after the implementation of“debt-to-equity swap”,the investor has no legal loss from the issuer,and the investor has no right to pursue the liability of misrepresentation on securities market after the reorganization.Because the value objectives of reorganization and securities supervision are different,the circumstances identified in reorganization documents should not be directly used as evidence to identify the issuer’s misrepresentation.The determination of the issuer’s misrepresentation is subject to the examination of the“material”standard.When the bond investor,according to the fair share transfer price,has not realized the 100%debt repayment in the reorganization,he has the right to request the third guarantor for repayment,or claims that the“gatekeeper”bears the relatively independent responsibility for misrepresentation.The interest calculated after the issuer’s reorganization procedure is started,as well as the overdue interest caused by the defaulted bond,liquidated damages,and reasonable expenses for realizing the creditor’s rights are within the scope of the gatekeeper’s liability.