《逻辑哲学论》中的奈克方块与投影规则——维特根斯坦前后期哲学中的“面相观看”

The Necker Cube and Law of Projection in the Tractatus:Aspect Seeing in Wittgenstein’s Early and Late Philosophy

“面相观看”问题是维特根斯坦后期哲学的主要关注点之一。他的《逻辑哲学论》中同样包含着一种“面相观看”的维度,即对于模棱两可式的图画——奈克方块的研究。为此,维特根斯坦给出了看到“两个不同事实”的解答。以“投影规则”的角度重新解读奈克方块问题,去展示《逻辑哲学论》中的投影规则如何在中期哲学的探索中转变为更为普遍的投影概念。此概念在维特根斯坦中后期哲学中对“面相观看”的讨论举足轻重。因此,对作为一座桥梁的“投影规则”如何连接起《逻辑哲学论》中的奈克方块问题与“面相观看”问题的分析,可以看作维特根斯坦前后期哲学之间存在连续性的内在例证。

It is wildly acknowledged that aspect seeing is one of the main concerns in Wittgenstein’s laterphilosophy. In this paper, it presents that there is also a dimension of aspect seeing in the Tractatus, in terms of thediscussion on the ambiguous figure — the Necker cube case. In discussing this case, Wittgenstein offers“ seeingtwo different facts” as the answer to seeing the cube. In analyzing the current studies, this paper will interpret thiscase in virtue of law of projection in a new way. By doing so, it shows the law of projection has been generalizedinto the generic conception of projection, during the transition of his philosophical development. It is precisely thisconception that is part and parcel to Wittgenstein’s later discussions on aspect seeing. This paper aims at presentinghow law of projection works as a bridge between the Necker cube case in the Tractatus and his later study on aspectseeing. It is also the internal proof of the continuity of Wittgenstein’s philosophical development.