考虑攻防博弈的调频辅助服务市场博弈均衡分析

Equilibrium of Frequency Control Ancillary Service Market Based on Attack-defense Game

通过不断健全市场交易规则,新型资源逐步参与调频市场,极大提升了调频性能与资源的灵活互济。然而,受制于成本因素,部分新型调频资源的网络安全防护等级较低,黑客可能利用网络安全漏洞破坏调频市场安全。基于此,提出一种考虑攻防博弈的调频市场博弈均衡分析方法。首先,分析考虑篡改防护薄弱型调频资源报价信息的黑客攻击行为;然后,从攻击者角度构建以利益攸关方获利最大化为目标的攻击模型,设计考虑攻防双方主从Stackelberg博弈的调频市场均衡模型;最后,分析基于列和约束生成(column-and-constraint generation,C&CG)算法的调频市场均衡结果,通过对30机组调频市场进行算例分析,容量收益平均偏移度从攻击下的113.89%变为防御后的12.56%,表明防御者可以抑制攻击者造成的市场均衡偏移。

With the improvement of electricity market rules,the power system operator permits new energy resources to gradually participate in the frequency control ancillary service market.The participation of new energy resources greatly enhance the frequency regulation performance and mutual support of different energy resources.However,some frequency regulation resources are usually equipped with insufficient cyber security protection measures due to economic considerations.Under this situation,hackers may exploit the vulnerability of susceptible cyber physical systems to disrupt the operation of frequency control ancillary service market.Therefore,we analyze frequency modulation market game equilibrium considering the attack-defense game.First,we analyze the cyber attack behaviors aiming at manipulating the bidding information of susceptible resources.Second,we analyze the attack model aiming at maximizing the profit of the complicity.Next,a frequency modulation market equilibrium model considering the master-slave Stackelberg game of both sides of attack and defense is designed.Finally,the frequency modulation market equilibrium results based on the Column-and-Constraint Generation(C&CG)algorithm are analyzed.Through case analysis of 30-unit frequency regulation markets,the average deviation of capacity revenue change from 113.89%under attack to 12.56%after defense,indicating that the defender can to a certain extent suppress the market equilibrium deviation caused by the attacker.