基于演化博弈的铁路代理服务主体行为策略选择研究

Research on Agency Service Subject Behavior Strategy of Railways Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

随着铁路运营管理模式的持续优化,我国铁路客运服务不断深化与第三方的合作,服务主体由单一化、共性化逐步向多元化、个性化转变。服务者的服务行为策略选择受到服务收益、成本以及服务质量监管部门的激励机制等因素影响,在我国铁路客运服务主体多元化的新常态下,分析参与铁路客运代理服务主体的行为策略选择,有助于促进铁路高质量发展。研究基于市场经济行为的视角,从演化博弈角度出发,构建在服务质量监管部门激励机制下的2类服务者演化博弈模型,通过分析双方之间的博弈关系,研究推进服务者行为策略选择的稳定条件及影响因素、演化趋势,为服务者策略选择和服务质量监管部门管理提供参考。

As the railway operation and management mode continues to be optimized,China’s railway passenger transport service has deepened its cooperation with the third party,and the service subject changes from simple and generic to diversified and personalized.The selection of service behavior strategy of service providers is influenced by service revenue,cost,and incentive system of the service quality supervision department.Under the new normal of diversified railway passenger service subjects in China,it is of great significance to analyze the behavior selection strategy of the agency service subject participating in railway passenger transport,which can promote the high-quality development of railways.Therefore,based on the perspective of market economic activities and evolutionary game theory,this paper constructed two types of evolutionary game models of service providers under the incentive mechanism of service quality supervision departments.By analyzing the game relationship between the two parties,it studied the stable conditions,influencing factors,and evolutionary trends that promoted the behavior strategy selection of service providers,which provides a reference for strategy selection of service providers and management measures of service quality supervision department.