职业教育中本衔接培养人才的政策执行偏差及其矫正策略——博弈论的视角

The Policy Implementation Deviation and Correction Strategy for Talents Cultivation of Transition from Secondary Vocational Schools to Undergraduate Colleges in Vocational Education——The Perspective of Game Theory

从博弈论的角度看,中本衔接政策执行是教育行政部门、中职学校、应用型本科高校和教师、学生及其家长等利益相关者基于个体利益进行多方博弈的过程,博弈主体的策略及其行为互动对政策目标达成具有重要影响。调查发现,浙江中本衔接政策执行存在招生、培养、评价方面的偏差。根据囚徒困境、委托—代理和智猪博弈模型分析发现,多方博弈主体之间的利益冲突、信息不对称和力量不均衡,引发个体理性背离集体理性、逆向选择、道德风险、搭便车等合作问题,造成政策发生执行偏差。矫正策略为:扩大招生规模,改革招生录取方式,强化教育教学质量评价及完善交流合作机制。

From the perspective of game theory,the policy implementation of transition from secondary vocational schools to undergraduate colleges is a process of multi-party game based on individual interests among educational administrative departments,secondary vocational schools,applied undergraduate universities,teachers,students and their parents.The strategy and behavior interaction of the game subject have an important impact on the achievement of policy objectives.The survey reveals that there are deviations in the implementation of Zhejiang's policy of integration of secondary vocational schools and undergraduate colleges in terms of enrollment,cultivation,and evaluation.According to the analysis of prisoner's dilemma,principal-agent and boxed pigs game model,it is found that the conflicts of interest,information asymmetry and power imbalance among the multi-game subjects lead to the deviation of individual rationality from collective rationality,adverse selection,moral hazard,free riding and other cooperation problems,resulting in the policy implementation deviation of the integration of secondary vocational school and undergraduate college.The correction strategies are as follows:expanding the scale of enrollment,reforming the way of enrollment and admission,strengthening the evaluation of education and teaching quality and improving the mechanism of communication and cooperation.