应急供应链企业数字化转型的动态博弈研究

Dynamic Game Study on Digital Transformation of Emergency Supply Chain Enterprises

通过构建政府补贴背景下应急供应链企业数字化转型的演化博弈模型,研究应急供应链企业的行为互动机制。研究结果表明:政府补贴存在一个最优区间,并非所有的政府补贴一定会促进应急供应链企业进行数字化转型,过高或过低的政府补贴并不能明显提升供应链企业数字化转型意愿。政府应在合理区间内加强对应急供应链企业数字化转型的专项补助,提高补贴的有效性和精准度,从而促进行业的良性、有序发展,进而促进应急救援效率的提升。

By constructing an evolutionary game model of digital transformation of emergency supply chain enterprises under the background of government subsidies,the behavioral interaction mechanism of emergency supply chain enterprises is studied.The research results show that there is an optimal range of government subsidies,not all government subsidies will definitely promote the digital transformation of emergency supply chain enterprises,and higher or lower government subsidies can not significantly improve the digital transformation willingness of supply chain enterprises.The government should strengthen special subsidies for the digital transformation of emergency supply chain enterprises within a reasonable range,improve the effectiveness and accuracy of subsidies,so as to promote the benign and orderly development of the industry,and further promote the emergency rescue efficiency.