工业用地市场化改革冲击与城市产业模式选择:来自工业用地招拍挂政策的证据

Industrial Land Marketization Reform Shock and City Industrial Model Choice:Empiri⁃cal Evidence from Industrial Land Bidding,Auction and Listing Policy

如何激励地方政府合理配置土地资源以推动二三产业协调发展是我国当前经济发展和产业转型的重要问题。文章以工业用地招拍挂政策出台作为准自然实验,研究工业用地市场化改革产生的财政激励如何影响地方政府在产业发展上的政策选择。基于2003—2013年277个地级市的面板数据,并以招拍挂政策出台以后协议出让土地的面积占比下降程度作为各地受到政策冲击的强度指标,文章通过构造连续双重差分模型研究发现:①工业用地招拍挂政策实施使得原来高度依靠协议出让工业用地的地区工业发展受到冲击,工业产值增长减缓,其中外资企业受到的冲击尤为显著。②受冲击地区第二产业增速减慢,企业利税总额在财政收入中的比重下降,导致地区财政压力显著上升。③地方政府为了应对财政压力一方面大力发展高污染高耗能产业,另一方面大幅增加土地出让和房地产开发投资,推动以房地产为核心的土地财政行业扩张。以上结果表明工业用地出让市场化改革在提高土地资源配置效率的同时,也对地方政府长期依赖的以廉价工业用地为基础的“以地引资”模式形成冲击。文章研究结论有助于理解财政激励对地方政府产业发展模式选择的影响,对我国在新发展阶段推进产业协调发展具有重要现实意义。

How to motivate local governments to allocate land resources reasonably to promote the coordinated development of the secondary and tertiary industries is an important issue in China's current economic development and industrial transformation.In particular,in the context of the local government's high dependence on land finance,less is known about how the change of the land transfer system affect the local government's industrial development choices.This paper takes the introduction of industrial land bidding,auction and listing policies as a quasi-natural experiment to study how fiscal incentives generated by the market-oriented reform of industrial land affect the policy choices of local governments in industrial development.Based on the panel data of 277 prefecture-level cities from 2003 to 2013,this paper constructs a continuous difference-indifference model by employing the changes in the proportion of land sold through agreement transfer after the implementation of industrial land bidding,auction and listing policies as an indicator of policy intensity.The estimation results find that:(1)The introduction of the policy of industrial land bidding,auction and listing has impeded the industrial development of the regions which previously highly depended on agreement transfer of industrial land and the negative effects are more pronounced for foreign industrial firms.(2)The proportion of the profits and taxes of enterprises in the fiscal revenue in the areas impacted by the industrial land market decreased,and the regional fiscal pressure increased significantly.(3)To cope with fiscal pressure,local governments,on the one hand,vigorously develop high-pollution and energy-consuming industries,on the other hand,substantially increase land transfer and real estate development investment,and promote the expansion of land finance industries.The above results show that while the market-oriented reform of industrial land transfer improves the efficiency of land resource allocation,it also has an impact on the“land-based investment”model that local governments have relied on for a long time based on cheap industrial land.This study contributes to the literature in several ways.First,this paper systematically studies the negative effects of the market-oriented reform of industrial land on urban industrial development,especially the impact on the“land-based investment”model that local governments have relied on for a long time.Second,this paper examines how the changes in fiscal relations between different industrial sectors caused by industrial land marketization affect the choice of local government’s industrial model,and enriches the literature on fiscal incentives and government behaviors.Finally,this paper uses local government fiscal incentives as a link to integrate relevant research to provide a more comprehensive theoretical explanation for unbalanced industrial development in many cities.This study has important policy implications.On the one hand,local governments should change the traditional mode of relying on lower land prices to develop industries,and reduce business operating costs by improving the business environment.On the other hand,in the process of promoting the development of the real economy and promoting new industrialization,the role of local government fiscal incentives should not be ignored.