区块链技术下的在线渠道供应链政府补贴策略研究

Research on Government Subsidy Strategy of Online Channel Supply Chain under Blockchain Technology

对于在线渠道供应链,考虑在线产品的防伪溯源,建立无政府补贴、创新补贴与数量补贴3种情形下制造商主导的Stackelberg模型,研究最优运营决策,分析不同补贴策略对供应链成员影响以及最优补贴策略。研究表明,在政府补贴策略下,供应链成员最优决策受到成本补贴比例、单位补贴额与区块链成本系数很大影响;两种补贴策略并不总是使在线平台、制造商与消费者更好,当信息溯源水平较小时,两种补贴策略均能促使三方形成三赢局面;对于三方来说,最优补贴策略的确定取决于区块链成本系数。

For the online channel supply chain,considering the anti-counterfeiting traceability of online products,a manufacturer-led Stackelberg model was established under three scenarios of anarchy subsidy,innovation subsidy and quantity subsidy.The optimal operational decision under the three scenarios was studied,and the impact of different subsidy strategies on supply chain members and the optimal subsidy strategies were analyzed.The results show that under the government subsidy strategy,the optimal decision of supply chain members is greatly affected by the cost subsidy ratio,unit subsidy amount and blockchain cost coefficient.The two subsidy strategies do not always make the online platform,the manufacturer and the consumer better.When the level of information traceability is low,both subsidy strategies can promote the three parties to form a win-win-win situation.For the three parties,the determination of the optimal subsidy strategy depends on the blockchain cost factor.