野生动物致害补偿的理论逻辑与机制优化

Theoretical Logic and Mechanism Optimization of Wildlife Damage Compensation

野生动物致害补偿有助于协调各方利益进而促进野生动物保护,已成为建设人与自然和谐共生现代化的重要举措。文中基于公共产品理论和演化博弈理论,在厘清野生动物致害补偿理论逻辑的基础上,构建农户与地方政府的演化博弈模型,并引入中央政府约束激励机制,分析利益相关者的策略选择及如何实现最优演化稳定策略。研究发现:农户若保护野生动物能获益,即使没有地方政府的补偿和中央政府的约束激励,仍会支持野生动物保护;农户与地方政府的自身博弈难以实现社会所期盼的最优演化稳定策略(支持,补偿),引入中央政府约束激励机制能够促进农户支持野生动物保护、地方政府开展野生动物致害补偿。据此,围绕激发农户保护野生动物的内生动力、构建科学合理的中央政府约束激励机制提出政策建议。

Wildlife damage compensation helps harmonize the interests of all parties and promote wildlife protection,which has become an important measure to build a harmonious coexistence between man and nature.Based on the theories of public goods and evolutionary game,this paper clarifies the theoretical logic of the compensation for wildlife damage,constructs an evolutionary game model between farmers and local governments,introduces the constraint and incentive mechanism of the central government,and analyzes the strategic choice of stakeholders to achieve the optimal evolutionary stability strategy.The results show that if farmers could benefit from wildlife protection,they would support wildlife protection even if there is no compensation from local government or constraint incentives from the central government.The game between farmers and local governments is difficult to achieve the optimal evolutionary stability strategy(support and compensation) expected by the society.Introducing the constraint and incentive mechanism of the central government can promote farmers to support wildlife protection and local governments to provide wildlife damage compensation.Therefore,policy recommendations are put forward to stimulate the endogenous power of farmers to protect wild animals and build a science-based and reasonable restraintincentive mechanism at the level of the central government.