平台扼杀式并购的反垄断悖论

The Antitrust Paradox of Platform Predatory Acquisitions

因应平台经济领域初创企业并购的浪潮,强化反垄断并购审查正逐渐成为中国乃至全球的监管共识。以消除潜在竞争或创新为目标的杀式并购以及由此产生抑制投融资的创新杀戮地带的理论基础存在应用局限。作为平台市场中创新研发和商业化过程的有效机制,并购能够实现规模效益、激励风险投资并且产生创新乘数效应。目前中国和域外司法辖区针对初创企业并购制定的包括修正申报标准、创设无门槛申报义务、强化事后调查和倒置举证责任等变革措施,将抑制风险资本市场的并购货币化、增加并购审查的非必要成本以及削弱商业确定性。初创企业并购审查政策的革新应当保持一定的限度,摒弃专门申报标准,澄清创新竞争损害,以及维持举证责任分配。同时,应当结合平台并购特性对既有监管框架作出必要调适,强化排他行为的审查,建立双阶段竞争审查,细化行为性救济措施,以及明确事后调查规则。

In response to the wave of acquisitions in the platform economy,strengthening antitrust review of acquisitions is gradually becoming a regulatory consensus both in China and globally.There are application limitations in the theoretical foundation of predatory acquisitions aimed at eliminating potential competition or innovation and the resulting innovation-killing zones that inhibit investment and financing.As an effective mechanism in the innovation research and commercialization processes of platform markets,acquisitions can achieve scale economies,incentivize venture capital,and generate innovation multiplier effects.Both China and foreign jurisdictions have implemented reform measures for startup acquisitions,including amending declaration standards,establishing no-threshold declaration obligations,enhancing post-investigation,and shifting the burden of proof.These measures will dampen the monetization of the risk capital market,increase unnecessary costs of acquisition review,and weaken business certainty.The reform policies for reviewing startup acquisitions should be restrained to a certain extent by such measures as abandoning specialized declaration standards,clarifying innovation competition harm,and maintaining the allocation of the burden of proof.Meanwhile,it is also necessary to adjust the existing regulatory framework in light of the characteristics of platform acquisitions,strengthen the review of exclusive behaviors,establish a two-stage competition review,refine behavioral remedies,and clarify post-investigation rules.