效能信息不对称下考虑零售商过度自信的供应链上游创新决策研究

Supply Chain Upstream Innovation Decisions under Asymmetric Effectiveness with Overconfident Retailer

本文构建了由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的两级供应链,基于信号博弈方法研究了创新效能信息不对称及零售商过度自信对供应链成员创新投入等决策及收益的影响。研究发现:伴随创新效能不确定性增强,分别形成混同均衡、向下扭曲与无扭曲的分离均衡,零售商过度自信会使无扭曲的分离均衡决策区间变宽;在混同与无扭曲的分离均衡中,零售商过度自信不利于制造商的创新投入及其收益;高创新效能出现概率增大并不总会带来好的效果,混同均衡下的创新投入水平与制造商收益反而受到消极影响,而无扭曲的分离均衡下则相反。数值分析显示,一定程度的过度自信可以提升零售商收益。总体来看,制造商应实施信息共享以获得更高的创新投入和利润水平。

A signaling game was constructed to investigate the supply chain upstream innovation decision with asymmetric effectiveness and the retailer's overconfidence.As the uncertainty of innovation effectiveness increases,pooling strategy,costly separating strategy,and costless separating strategy were formed respectively.Moreover,overconfidence can widen the decision interval for the costless separating strategy.Under the pooling and costless separating strategy,the retailer's overconfidence is detrimental to innovation efforts and the manufacturer's profit.The increase in the probability of high innovation effectiveness does not always have a positive effect.The level of innovation and the manufacturer's profit are negatively affected in the pooling strategy,while the opposite is true in the costless separating strategy.Numerical analysis shows that a certain level of overconfidence can improve the retailer's profit.The manufacturer should implement an information information-sharing strategy to obtain higher innovation efforts and profits.