农户生产性服务约束方式选择逻辑:来自生产风险与交易成本的考量

Choosing Logic of Constraint Mode of Farmer's Productive Services:Considerations from Production Risks and Transaction Costs

服务约束行为是农户在农业生产性服务“委托—代理”问题下的理性反应。本文基于服务风险和交易成本视角,探讨了农户服务约束行为的驱动因素。研究发现:(1)为降低农业生产性服务过程中“委托—代理”问题所引致的生产风险,农户作为风险规避者,会通过一系列服务约束手段规范服务供给主体的作业行为,尤其是在生产风险较高的插秧、施肥和打药环节表现更为突出。(2)交易成本的高低是影响农户不同服务约束方式选择的主要因素,土地细碎化程度越高,服务合约缔造的交易成本越高,越不利于农户服务合约签订;农业劳动力质量越高,服务监督的机会成本就越高,会抑制农户服务监督行为的发生。(3)服务供给者来源与组织化程度对农户服务约束行为具有调节作用,服务供给者来源越熟悉且组织化程度越高,越能降低农户对生产风险的担忧,从而减少服务约束。由此,为抑制服务供给方“委托—代理”行为发生,建议在培养组织化、本土化的服务供给主体同时要探索构建服务供需双方的激励相容机制。

Service constraint behavior is the rational response of farmers to the“principal-agent”problem of agricultural productive services.Based on the perspective of service risk and transaction cost,this paper discusses the driving factors of farmers'service constraint behavior.The study finds that:(1)In order to reduce the production risk caused by the“principal-agent”problem in the process of agricultural productive services,farmers,as risk averses,will standardize the operation behavior of service providers through a series of service constraints,especially in the links of transplanting,fertilizing and spraying with high production risk.(2)Transac cost is the main factor affecting the choice of farmers'different service constraints.The higher degree of land fragmentation,the higher transaction cost of service contract,the less conducive to the signing of the service contract for farmers;the higher quality of agricultural labor,the higher opportunity cost of service supervision,which will inhibit the occurrence of farmers'service supervision behavior.(3)The source and degree of organization of service providers have a moderating effect on farmers'service restraint behavior.The more familiar the source of service providers and the higher the degree of organization,the more they can reduce farmersc'oncerns about production risks,so as to reduce service constraints.