非控股大股东退出威胁与多元化经营:抑制还是促进?

The Exit Threats of Non-controlling Major Shareholders and Corporate Diversification:Inhibition or Promotion?

该文基于2007—2021年沪深两市A股上市公司的样本,检验了非控股大股东退出威胁对企业多元化经营的影响。研究发现:非控股大股东退出威胁发挥治理效应约束企业多元化扩张,主要作用机制是减少管理层在职消费和抑制控股股东掏空行为;异质性检验发现,当公司管理层持股、存在实际控制人、信息环境质量高及处于竞争性行业时,退出威胁对多元化的抑制作用更显著;拓展性检验发现非控股大股东退出威胁降低了企业非相关和相关多元化程度,且对非相关多元化的减少更显著,并提升了多元化经营价值。

Based on the sample of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2007 to 2021,we tested the impact of the exit threats of the non-controlling major shareholders on corporate diversification.The results show that the exit threats of the non-controlling major shareholders exerts its governance function to restrict the diversified expansion of enterprises.Its main mechanism of action is to reduce the on-the-job consumption of management and restrain the hollowing-out behavior of controlling shareholders.The heterogeneity test finds that the inhibitory effect is more significant when the company’s executives hold shares,when there are actual controllers,when in competitive industries,and when the quality of the information environment is high.The expansion test finds that the exit threats of the non-controlling major shareholders reduce the degree of irrelevant and relevant diversification,and are more significant in reducing unrelated diversification,which improves the value of diversification at the same time.