摘要
本文基于2014-2021年沪深A股上市公司样本,结合《高新技术企业认定管理办法》这一产业政策的实施,运用群聚估计检验企业是否借助研发操纵以获得高新技术企业认定。在此基础上,以各地区大数据管理机构改革作为数字政府建设的准自然实验,运用双重差分法考察数字政府对企业研发操纵的影响。研究发现,中国上市公司中存在较为明显的研发操纵现象。然而,数字政府建设显著抑制了企业研发操纵。原因在于,数字政府建设有效地提升了政府对企业研发操纵的监管能力。此外,在非国有企业、互联网和新闻媒体监督难以发挥作用的样本中,数字政府抑制企业研发操纵的作用更强。本文为政府在数字时代更好发挥产业政策的作用提供理论和经验证据。
Using a sample of A-share listed companies between 2014 and 2021 and based on the specific industrial policy of“Management Measures for the Recognition of High-tech Enterprises”,this paper employs the bunching method to examine whether companies have obtained high-tech enterprise status through R&D manipulation.Drawing on this,and using the reform of big data management institutions in various regions as a quasi-natural experiment,the paper employs the difference-indifferences(DID)model to explore the impact that digital government exerts on corporate R&D manipulation.The research reveals that the phenomenon of R&D manipulation is often prevalent among China’s listed companies.However,the development of digital government has significantly suppressed corporate R&D manipulation activities.The key reason for all this lies in the fact that digital government development has been effectively enhancing the government’s capacity to oversee corporate R&D manipulation.Furthermore,the influence of digital government on corporate R&D manipulation is particularly prominent in samples of non-state-owned enterprises and in some cases where internet and media supervision is weak.This paper offers theoretical and empirical evidence for the government to leverage industrial policies more effectively in the new digital era.
作者
孟元
杨蓉
Meng Yuan;Yang Rong
出处
《世界经济》
北大核心
2024年第1期118-149,共32页
The Journal of World Economy
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目(71573090)的资助。
关键词
数字政府
研发操纵
产业政策
大数据管理机构改革
digital government
R&D manipulation
industrial policy
big data management institution reform