基建项目业主代表寻租及各方合谋的博弈分析

Game Analysis of Rent-seeking by Owners’ Representatives and All the Parties' Collusion in the Infrastructure Projects

在研究基础设施建设过程中因合谋产生的腐败犯罪现象时,大多数研究重点在业主方、施工方与监理方的合谋行为。然而在实际基础建设项目实施过程中,作为业主方维护自身利益派遣的业主代表,可能会因寻租行为与其他责任主体合谋损害业主方利益。为探索避免国有资产因业主代表寻租及各方合谋流失的措施,本文以博弈论视角分析基础建设项目各方主体关系以及博弈行为,建立业主代表寻租及各方合谋的博弈模型,提出业主代表寻租及各方合谋的前提条件,并通过对合谋体发生合谋的条件及理论分析明确了合谋体合谋的博弈条件。本文从制度建设、增强惩戒和提高合理收益三个方面提出措施建议,以期提高业主方打击业主代表寻租及合谋的成功率,降低各方合谋意愿。

When studying corruption crimes caused by collusion in the infrastructure projects,most studies focus on the collusion among owners,constructors,and supervisors.However,in the actual implementation of capital construction projects,as owners’representatives dispatched by the owners to protect their interests,they will conspire with other responsible parties to damage the owners’interests due to rent-seeking behavior.In order to explore measures to avoid the loss of assets due to rent-seeking by owners’representatives and the collusion of all the parties,this study analyzes the relationship of all the parties involved in the capital construction project and the game behavior from the perspective of game theory,establishes the game model of rent-seeking by the owner’s representatives and all the parties’collusion,proposes the prerequisites for rent-seeking by owners’representatives and collusion among all the parties.And through the theoretical analysis of the conditions of collusion parties,their game conditions are clarified.This paper puts forward suggestions from three aspects:system construction,strengthening punishment,and improving reasonable income,so as to improve the success rate of the owner's attacking the rent-seeking and collusion of the owner's representatives and reduce the collusion intention of all the parties.