行权业绩考核、企业生命周期与股权激励效应

Vesting Performance Hurdle,Corporate Life Cycle and the Effect of Equity Incentive

科学的业绩考核是有效激励的前提,既可能通过利益协同机制强化激励效应(利益协同假说),也可能通过降低风险承担而造成激励扭曲(风险规避假说)。本文基于企业生命周期的动态视角,考察了股权激励的行权业绩考核在企业不同发展阶段的异质性影响效应和作用机制。研究发现:行权业绩考核总体上有利于强化股权激励效应,支持了“利益协同假说”;分发展阶段看,行权业绩考核的作用效果具有生命周期异质性。其中,成长期企业更适宜设置适中的业绩目标,成熟期企业更适宜设置严格的业绩目标,衰退期企业更适宜设置宽松的业绩目标。进一步研究发现,行权业绩考核可通过利益协同和风险承担两条潜在渠道发挥作用,但具体机制因企业所处发展阶段的不同而存在明显差异。

Scientific performance hurdle is the premise of effective incentive,which can either enhance the incentive effect by strengthening benefit synergy(benefit synergy hypothesis)or cause incentive distortion by reducing risk taking(risk avoidance hypothesis).Based on the dynamic perspective of corporate life cycle,this paper investigates the heterogeneous effect and mechanism of vesting performance hurdle of equity incentive in different development stages of enterprises.The results show that vesting performance hurdles are conducive to strengthening firms future performance,which supports the benefit synergy hypothesis.The effects of vesting performance hurdles manifest significant life cycle heterogeneity.For enterprises in the growing stage,moderate performance hurdles can better improve performance.For mature enterprises,stringent performance hurdles can promote future performance more significantly.For enterprises in the declining stage,lax performance hurdles are more effective for performance enhancement.Further study finds that stringent performance hurdles promote the performance of companies in the growing stage mainly through the benefit synergy effect,while lax performance hurdles drive the performance of companies in the declining stage mainly through the risk-taking effect.For growing firms,moderate performance hurdles enhance future performance through both the benefit synergy effect and the risk-taking effect.