“双碳”背景下绿色供应链金融演化博弈模型及仿真研究

Evolutionary Game Model and Simulation of Green Supply Chain Finance Under the Background of“Double Carbon”

构建了在双碳背景下绿色供应链金融业务中“政府部门金融机构核心企业中小企业”四方主体组成的动态演化博弈模型,探讨了各方主体策略选择,分析了策略组合稳定性,并收集案例数据对演化博弈模型进行参数赋值,运用MATLAB展开仿真模拟探究初始策略变化对策略选择的影响。研究发现:政府部门采取严格监管有利于促进核心企业提供担保、金融机构发放贷款、中小企业采取绿色管理;采取绿色管理付出的额外成本和担保产生的监督成本分别是影响中小企业和核心企业演化到理想稳定状态的主要因素;供应链未来预期收益增长和核心企业担保代为偿还贷款时对中小企业惩罚力度的增加,可以提升核心企业担保和中小企业采取绿色管理的积极性;较大的不贷款惩罚配合近似传统商业贷款与绿色贷款收益差值的补贴,能更好地激发金融机构贷款的积极性;绿色管理正面行业效应增加能有效激励中小企业采取绿色管理;担保风险补偿增加可以促进核心企业选择担保策略,但会导致政府部门最终呈现波动不稳定状态。

Under the background of carbon peaking and carbon neutrality targets,considering the multi-part participation and mutual influence in the development of green supply chain finance business,this paper constructs a dynamic evolutionary game model consisting of four players of“government department,financial institutions,core enterprises,small and medium-sized enterprises”,discusses the choice of each player s strategy,analyzes the stability of strategy combination,and collects case data to assign parameters to the evolutionary game model.MATLAB was used to conduct numerical simulation to explore the impact of initial strategy change on strategy selection.It is concluded that strict regulation by government departments is conducive to promoting core enterprise guarantee,financial institution loan and small and medium-sized enterprises to adopt green management;The extra cost to adopt green management and the supervision cost to guarantee are the main factors affecting the evolution of small and medium-sized enterprises and core enterprises to the ideal stable state respectively;The expected future income of supply chain and the increase of punishment on small and medium-sized enterprises when core enterprises guarantee to repay loans on behalf of it can enhance the enthusiasm of core enterprises guarantee and small and medium-sized enterprises to adopt green management;A large penalty for non-lending combined with subsidies similar to the profit difference between traditional commercial loans and green loans can better stimulate the enthusiasm of financial institutions in lending;The increase of positive industry effect of green management can effectively encourage small and medium-sized enterprises to adopt green management;The increase of guarantee risk compensation can promote core enterprises to choose the guarantee strategy,but it will lead to the final fluctuation and instability of government departments.