股份回购的信号传递、输送利益与经济后果研究——以万丰奥威为例

On the Signaling,Tunneling and Economic Consequences of Share Repurchases——A Case Study of Wanfeng Auto Wheel

以万丰奥威2019年股份回购事件为例,采用事件研究和断点检验等方法,从信息披露视角探究股份回购的信号传递、输送利益及经济后果。研究发现:控股股东质押股权面临平仓风险时,上市公司股份回购名为信号传递,实则是向控股股东输送利益。虽然投资者短期内难以识别利益输送动机,但积极信号带来的股价上涨是暂时的,该回购行为最终会侵害上市公司权益。研究有助于推动我国资本市场高质量发展,对投资者投资、企业资本运作和监管部门监管亦具有实践参考价值。

With share repurchases of Wanfeng Auto Wheel in 2019 as an example,this paper adopts event study and breakpoint testing to explore the signaling,tunneling and economic consequences of share repurchases from the perspective of information disclosure.The study finds that when controlling shareholders'pledged equities are at the risk of closing a position,share repurchases of the listed company,in their essence,are tunneling to the controlling shareholder in the name of signaling,and that although it is difficult for investors to identify the motive of tunneling in the short term,increases in share prices brought by positive signaling is temporary,and such repurchases ultimately undermine the listed company.The study helps to promote the high-quality development of China's capital market,and also provides practical reference for investors'investment,corporate capital operation and supervision by regulatory authorities.