人工智能参与司法审判的法律责任承担——基于Chat GPT首份判决书产生的思考

Legal Liability for Artificial Intelligence Participation in Judicial Trials - Reflections Based on Chat GPT's First Judgement

随着人工智能时代的到来和司法的不断发展改革,人工智能技术已经越来越多地参与司法审判工作。哥伦比亚某法官在判决书中引入了Chat GPT的回答,成为全球首例人工智能参与法庭判决的实践。Chat GPT在本案中的表现虽然被广泛认可,但仍无法确保其能成为人工智能参与司法审判工作的常态。因此,关于人工智能在参与司法审判过程中可能引发的法律责任承担问题得到了广泛关注。具体而言,首先可以通过人工智能并不具备法律主体身份以排除其担责可能;实际上,哪怕赋予其法律主体地位,其承担法律责任也不具备现实意义。在生产者和审判者的责任分布中,由审判者优先承担责任再视情况向生产开发者追偿的处理原则具有现实合理性。审判者承担法律责任的情形可以分为主观故意和过失两种,同时也存在一定的豁免情形。对于人工智能法律责任归结难题的脱困路径可以从对人工智能算法黑箱进行限制;坚守以司法人员为中心的司法审判模式和法院和国家进行责任概括承受三个方面入手。

With the advent of the age of artificial intelligence and the continuous development and reform of the judiciary,artificial intelligence technology has become increasingly involved in judicial trials.A judge in Colombia introduced Chat GPT's answer in his judgement,which became the world's first practice of AI participation in court judgement.Chat GPT's good performance in this case,although widely recognised,still cannot ensure that it can become the working routine of AI participation in judicial trials.The issue of legal liability arising from AI's participation in the judicial trial process has thus been widely noticed.Specifically,first of all,artificial intelligence does not have the status of legal subject to exclude the possibility of its responsibility;in fact,even if it is given the status of legal subject,its assumption of legal responsibility does not have the practical significance.In the distribution of responsibility between the producer and the judge,the principle of the judge taking priority responsibility and then recovering from the producer and developer as appropriate is realistic and reasonable.Judges can be divided into two kinds of subjective intent and negligence,and there are also certain exemptions.The way out of the difficulty of attributing legal responsibility for AI can start from the restriction of the black box of AI algorithms,the adherence to the judicial trial mode centred on judicial personnel,and the responsibility of the court and the state to bear the responsibility of the general three aspects.