考虑外来企业进入的两阶段定价和以旧换新选择研究

Research on the Two-stage Pricing and Selection of Trade-in Considering Invasive Firm Entry

针对外来企业进入市场与在位企业竞争,构建了在位企业两阶段动态定价博弈模型,分析了外来企业进入对在位企业两阶段产品定价和以旧换新策略的影响。研究结果表明,当外来企业不进入时,只有升级产品的创新程度较低,在位企业才提供以旧换新策略;当外来企业进入时,在位企业不提供以旧换新会使部分第一阶段产品持有者不再购买其升级产品,而提供以旧换新能使第一阶段产品持有者都购买其升级产品。以旧换新不仅对在位企业有利,而且对外来企业也有利。

Aiming at the entry of invasive firms into the market to compete with incumbent firms,a two-stage dynamic pricing game model of incumbent firms was constructed.The impact of invasive firms′entry on pricing and trade-in strategies for incumbent firms was analyzed.The results show that when there are not invasive firms,incumbent firms offer a trade-in strategy only when the innovation level of the upgraded product is low.When invasive firm enters,the incumbent firm does not provide the trade-in that will make some of the first-stage product holders no longer buy its ccpgraded products,while providing the trade-in will make all the first-stage product holders buy its upgraded products.