医疗服务领域中的价格歧视——以特需门诊为例

Price Discrimination in the Field of Medical Services:Evidences from the Special Need Clinic in China

特需门诊是医院为了提高利润而采取的一种价格歧视策略。本文通过构建博弈模型,分析了医院对普通门诊和特需门诊的资源配置行为和特需门诊对不同类型患者福利的影响,并进一步分析了数量管制政策的效果。该博弈模型的子博弈精炼纳什均衡结果表明,如果政府没有采取任何管制政策,那么医院将把全部医疗资源配置到特需门诊,全体患者的福利受损。当政府采取数量管制政策时,价格歧视对患者福利的损害程度减轻,但是特需门诊患者和普通门诊患者的福利水平依旧是下降的。从保护患者福利的视角出发,政府应该进一步完善管制政策体系,限制特需门诊的发展。

Special need clinic is a price discrimination strategy adopted by hospitals to increase their profits.By constructing a game model,this paper analyzes the resource allocation behavior of hospitals to general and special need clinics and the impact of special need clinics on the welfare of different types of patients,and further analyzes the effect of quantity regulatory policies.The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game model shows that if the government does not adopt any regulatory policy,then the hospital will allocate all resources to the special need clinic and the welfare of all patients is impaired.When the government adopts a quantity regulatory policy,the damage of price discrimination to the welfare of patients is reduced,but the welfare level of special need clinic patients and general outpatients remains reduced.From the perspective of protecting patients welfare,the government should further improve the regulatory policy system to restrict the development of special need clinic.