债务置换、系统性金融风险与宏观政策搭配

Debt Replacement,Systemic Financial Risk and Macro Policy Coordination

我国推出债务置换政策致力于化解地方政府债务风险问题,但关于该政策能否有效化解风险以及其作用机制如何,目前尚无定论。本文通过构建动态随机一般均衡模型(DSGE)探索如何防范与化解债务置换政策对系统性金融风险的负面影响。理论分析发现,债务置换政策尽管能够缓解地方政府的短期违约风险,但是可能会带来系统性金融风险上升的副作用。其副作用来源于两种渠道:流动性渠道和违约转移渠道,债务置换设计中应该充分关注这两种渠道的副作用。本文还发现,搭配货币政策或宏观审慎政策可以缓解债务置换副作用,相比之下宏观审慎政策更加有效。因此,为更好地保障债务置换政策的成功,本文建议实施“债务置换+宏观审慎”的政策组合。

The debt replacement policy launched in China aims to resolve the issue of local government debt risk.However,there is still no consensus on whether this policy can effectively mitigate risk and how it works.This paper constructs a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium(DSGE)to investigate how to prevent and mitigate the side effects of debt replacement policy on systemic financial risks.Theoretical analysis reveals that while debt replacement policy can alleviate the short-term default risk of the local government,it can also bring about the side effect of increasing systemic financial risk.The side effect comes from two channels:liquidity channel and default transfer channel,so the design of debt replacement should fully consider the side effects of these two channels.This study reveals that combining monetary policy or macroprudential policy can alleviate the side effects of debt replacement,with the latter being more effective.Therefore,to better ensure the success of debt replacement policy,this paper suggests implementing a policy combination of "debt replacement+macroprudential measures".