摘要
横向府际协同对于提高地方政府低碳治理绩效,助力我国双碳目标实现有着至关重要的作用。但地方政府当前的低碳治理中却存在着各施其政、唱独角戏、合作弱化等问题,究其原因,是低碳治理的府际协同中出现了协同惰性。本文基于我国225个城市2013-2021年的面板数据,从地方政府经济竞争视角探明了低碳治理中协同惰性的发生机理,揭示了其对于低碳治理绩效提升的阻碍作用,并进一步找到了基于纵向干预的消解策略。研究发现:地方政府承受的经济竞争压力会显著激化其在低碳治理中的协同惰性;协同惰性会严重阻碍地方政府低碳治理绩效的提升;协同惰性是经济竞争压力干扰地方政府低碳治理的核心机制;上级政府的纵向干预不仅可以削弱协同惰性的生成,还可以减缓其对于低碳治理绩效提升的阻碍作用。基于此,本文为破解地方政府低碳治理协同困境,助力低碳治理绩效提升提供了理论和政策启示。
Horizontal intergovernmental collaboration plays a crucial role in improving the low-carbon governance performance of local governments and helping to achieve China’s“Dual-Carbon”goals.However,the current low carbon governance of local governments is characterized by problems such as each government doing its own thing,singing a solo role and weakening cooperation.The reason is that competition pressure has intensified collaborative inertia.Based on the panel data of 225 cities in China from 2013 to 2021,this paper analyzes the generation logic of collaborative inertia in low-carbon governance of local governments from the perspective of competition pressure.The empirical conclusion shows that:(1)Competition pressure has significantly intensified the collaborative inertia of local governments in low-carbon governance;(2)Collaborative inertia will seriously hinder the improvement of local governments’low-carbon governance performance;(3)Collaborative inertia is the core mechanism that hinders the improvement of low-carbon governance performance of local governments due to the competition pressure;(4)Vertical intervention can significantly weaken the mechanism of collaborative inertia.Vertical intervention by higher-level governments can not only weaken the generation of collaborative inertia,but also alleviate its hindering effect on the improvement of low-carbon governance performance.The research conclusion not only reveals the background and mechanism of the generation of collaborative inertia,but also explores the resolution strategies of vertical intervention,providing theoretical and policy inspiration for overcoming the dilemma of low carbon governance.
作者
关斌
高苹桂
Guan Bin;Gao Pinggui(School of Management,Lanzhou University,Lanzhou 730000)
出处
《中国行政管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2024年第1期43-59,共17页
Chinese Public Administration
基金
国家自然科学基金项目“地方政府低碳治理中公共价值冲突的发生机理、作用机制及消解路径研究”(编号:72204103)
甘肃省科技计划项目软科学专项“甘肃省县域政府低碳治理绩效的测度模型、评价方法与提升机制研究”(编号:23JRZA393)
中央高校基本科研业务费项目(编号:2022jbkyjd002)。
关键词
低碳治理绩效
经济竞争压力
协同惰性
纵向干预
Low-carbon Governance Performance
Collaborative Inertia
Competition Pressure
Vertical Intervention